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Verify the integrity of a piece of code executing in an
untrusted system
1. Execute foo()
2. Send back the result
1. foo() has been executed?
2. Is the result of foo() authentic?
Can we prove 1 and 2 with a pure software-based solution?
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Software-based attestation through challenge-response
Verifier Untrusted system
1. Send challenge
2. Compute checksum
3. Send back the checksum
The verifier challenges the untrusted system (to compute a
checksum)
Any attempt to tamper the execution environment results in a
noticeable overhead in checksum computation
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Software-based attestation through challenge-response
Verifier Untrusted system
1. Send challenge
2. Compute checksum
3. Send back the checksum
The untrusted system executes the checksum function
Should be executed at the highest level of privilege
Should execute without any interruption
Any attempt to tamper the execution environment results in a
noticeable overhead in checksum computation
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Software-based attestation through challenge-response
Verifier Untrusted system
1. Send challenge
2. Compute checksum
3. Send back the checksum
The checksum must be received within a time interval
Time is measured by an external entity (the verifier)
If the checksum is wrong or the timeout has expired,
attestation fails
Any attempt to tamper the execution environment results in a
noticeable overhead in checksum computation
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Pioneer: State-of-the-art software-based attestation
solution
Characteristics
Applies to legacy systems (e.g., no TPM)
Checksum function is known a priori
Implementation of the checksum function is time-optimal
The challenge is in a seed to initialize the checksum function
Limitations
Researchers found ways to thwart Pioneer
(e.g., through TLBs desynchronization)
Does not take into account hypervisor-based attackers
Pioneer: Verifying Code Integrity and Enforcing Un-tampered Code Execution on Legacy Systems
(Sheshadri, Pradeep, Mark Luck, Doorn, Perrig, Elaine)
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Conqueror: Bullet-proof software-based code attestation
Features
Legacy systems (e.g., no TPM)
Immune to all the attacks that are known to defeat Pioneer
Effective even against hypervisor-based attackers
Threat model
Attacker cannot operate in SMM
No hardware-based attacks (e.g., DMA attacks)
Single thread of execution (e.g., no SMP)
Attacker cannot leverage a pristine or more powerful system
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How Conqueror works?
Variation of the traditional challenge-response scheme
The challenge is not a seed, but consists in the whole
checksum function
The checksum function is:
1. Generated on demand
2. Obfuscated
3. Self-decrypting
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Rationale behind Conqueror
Conqueror’s checksum functions are not optimal
As functions are generated on demand and obfuscated,
attackers must first analyze them
Our claim
An attacker has two options:
Static analysis
Dynamic analysis
Both static and dynamic attacks introduce a noticeable overhead
in checksum computation
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Conqueror protocol
t0
Verifier Untrusted system
1. Checksum function
2. Decryption key
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5. Checksum
7. Output
Executable
Send function
Checksum function
TPEB
Executable
Send function
Checksum function
TPEB
Generated on demand,
obfuscated and encrypted
Hardware-dependent
If t ′ > t0 + ∆t or checksum is wrong,
attestation fails
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Tamper-Proof Environment Bootstrapper (TPEB)
Send function
Executable
TPEB
Untrusted system
c0
c1
c2
c3
c4
h0
c6
c7
c8
c9
c10
c11
c12
c13
c14c15
c16
c5
h1
h2h3
Epilogue
Checksum
loop
IDT
Checksum function
Prologue
BASE
BASE + 0xFFF
BASE + SIZE
Attestation of the memory
region [BASE, BASE + SIZE)
Attestation of the environment:
I Maximum privilege
I Interrupts disabled
I No hypervisor
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Tamper-Proof Environment Bootstrapper (TPEB)
Send function
Executable
TPEB
Untrusted system
c0
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Checksum
loop
IDT
Checksum function
Prologue
BASE
BASE + 0xFFF
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Prologue
1. Disables maskable interrupts
2. Decrypts the rest of the page
3. Installs custom interrupt
handlers
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Tamper-Proof Environment Bootstrapper (TPEB)
Send function
Executable
TPEB
Untrusted system
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c12
c13
c14c15
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c5
h1
h2h3
Epilogue
Checksum
loop
IDT
Checksum function
Prologue
BASE
BASE + 0xFFF
BASE + SIZE
Checksum loop
Made of different gadgets
They update the running value
of the checksum according to
the content of a memory
location
Gadgets are selected and
combined randomly
Gadgets are obfuscated
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Tamper-Proof Environment Bootstrapper (TPEB)
Send function
Executable
TPEB
Untrusted system
c0
c1
c2
c3
c4
h0
c6
c7
c8
c9
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c11
c12
c13
c14c15
c16
c5
h1
h2h3
Epilogue
Checksum
loop
IDT
Checksum function
Prologue
BASE
BASE + 0xFFF
BASE + SIZE
Epilogue
Invokes the send function
Transfers the control to the
executable
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Checksum loop
Iterate the memory to attest in a pseudorandom fashion
The content of each location is fed to a different gadget, that
updates the checksum
The whole memory traversal process is repeated multiple times
for (i = 0, j = 0; i < ITERATIONS; i++) {
x = seed(i) % (SIZE / 4);
do {
x = (x + (x*x | 5)) % (SIZE / 4);
checksum gadget[j++ % GADGETS](BASE + x*4);
} while (x != seed(i) % (SIZE / 4));
}
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Gadgets
Active gadgets
Intentionally executed by the
checksum function
Update the checksum
Verify the trustworthiness of the
environment
Passive gadgets
Executed on interrupts and
exceptions
Corrupt the checksum when
unexpected events occur
Registered by installing a custom
interrupt descriptor table
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Active gadgets: Plain checksum computation
Most frequently used gadget
Simply updates the checksum
mov ADDR, %eax
mov (%eax), %eax
xor $0xa23bd430, %eax
add %eax, CHKSUM+4
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Active gadgets: IDT attestation
IDT is part of the TPEB
Normal checksum computation attests the content of the IDT
Need a gadget to attest the address of the IDT
mov ADDR, %eax
mov (%eax), %eax
add %eax, CHKSUM+8
sidt IDTR
mov IDTR+2, %eax
xor $0x6127f1, %eax
add %eax, CHKSUM+8
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Active gadgets: System mode attestation
Prevent the computation of the checksum from user mode
Update the checksum through privileged instructions
If executed in user mode, these instructions raise an exception
mov ADDR, %eax
mov (%eax), %eax
xor $0x1231d22, %eax
mov %eax, %dr3
mov %dr3, %ebx
add %ebx, CHKSUM
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Active gadgets: Instruction and data pointers attestation
Based on self-modifying code
Prevent memory copy attacks (e.g., TLB desynchronization)
Attest that the VA ↔ PHY holds for read, write and fetch
operations
mov ADDR, %eax
mov (%eax), %eax
lea l smc, %ebx
roll $0x2, 0x1(%ebx)
l smc:
xor $0xdeadbeef, %eax
add %eax, CHKSUM+4
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Active gadgets: Hypervisor detection
Rich ongoing debate on this topic . . .
Exploit timing attacks to detect running HVMs
Execute instruction that unconditionally trap to the hypervisor
mov ADDR, %eax
mov (%eax), %ebx
vmlaunch
xor $0x7b2a63ef, %ebx
sub %ebx, CHKSUM+8
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Evaluation
Experimental setup
Prototype for Microsoft Windows XP (32-bit)
I Verifier: user/kernel component
I Untrusted system: device driver
Two scenarios:
1. Static attack (e.g., reverse engineering of the checksum function)
2. Dynamic hypervisor-based attack (most powerful attacker)
Parameters
∼ 100 gadgets, minimum 5% for hypervisor detection
Rely on a trusted system to estimate network RTT and
maximum checksum computation time
Trusted and untrusted systems have the same hardware
configuration
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Estimating the maximum checksum computation time
Execution time of checksum functions can be precomputed
using a trusted system
Use Chebyshev’s inequality to estimate an upper bound on
computation
Pr(µ− σ ≤ X ≤ µ+ σ) ≥ 1− 1
λ2
Computation time
(including RTT)
Upper bound is ∆t = µ+ λσ
We choose λ = 11, to obtain a confidence > 99%
For a given checksum function, we estimate ∆t by challenging
the trusted system multiple times
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Checksum computation time
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No attack
Hypervisor-based attack
No checksum was forged in time to be considered valid
No authentic checksum was considered forged
L. Martignoni, R. Paleari, D. Bruschi Conqueror: tamper-proof code execution on legacy systems 15
Conclusions
We extended current state-of-the-art code attestation solutions
Prototype implementation of our attestation scheme
Conqueror is the basic building block of our next projects
I “Dynamic and Transparent Analysis of Commodity Production Systems”
(ASE 2010)
I “Live and Trustworthy Forensic Analysis of Commodity Production Systems”
(RAID 2010)
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Conqueror
Tamper-proof code execution on legacy systems
Send function
Executable
c0
c1
c2
c3
c4
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loop
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Checksum function
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BASE
BASE + 0xFFF
BASE + SIZE
Thank you!
Any questions?
Roberto Paleari
roberto@security.dico.unimi.it
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Backup slides
Estimating the ideal number of memory iterations
Time overhead suffered by a hypervisor-based attacker, using 5
checksum functions
We assume the attacker has RTT = 0
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Upper bound on network RTT
Two iterations of the checksum loop are enough
To prevent false negatives, we perform four iterations
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